In “Rethinking the Coming of the Civil War: A Counterfactual Exercise,” author Gary J. Kornblith postulates that the events leading up to the Civil War would have been drastically different had Henry Clay defeated James K. Polk in the presidential election of 1844. In essence, Kornblith argues that, the election of the annexationist president, James K. Polk, was the first in a long series of events that precipitated a massive sectional dispute between the north and the south. If Kornblith’s argument could be visualized as an arrangement of dominos, Polk’s 1844 election would be the original kick that caused all the dominos, up to and past the Civil War, to inevitably come crashing to the ground. In brief, Kornblith argues that the dominos fell in this order: Polk’s election caused the annexation of Texas, which led to the Mexican-American war and subsequent Mexican Cession, which introduced the question of slavery in the new territory and the subsequent Wilmot Proviso, which exacerbated sectional conflict between the north and the south, and along with the creation of the Republican Party, led to southern secession and then the Civil War. With each leap from the previous domino to next, Kornblith argues that a Civil War becomes more and more inevitable prospect. However, by erasing Polk and supplanting Clay in this “counterfactual exercise,” Kornblith argues that a Civil War would have probably never taken place.
To make this argument, Kornblith first presents evidence to establish that the race between Clay and Polk was so close, that the resulting Polk victory can be considered “arbitrary” (Kornblith 84). Although he discusses the various advantages that Clay held over Polk in the 1844 election, such as name recognition(Kornblith 82), his main argument can be boiled down to the fact that, had Clay received a few thousand more votes in New York, he would have won the election. He claims that even a slightly lower immigrant turnout in New York would have won Clay the election (Kornblith
84). Kornblith would probably suffice to say that a bad rainstorm on Election Day in New York would have cost Polk the election. Under the assumption that the election results were merely arbitrary, he logically replaces Polk with Clay, and speculates that the Mexican American War would have not occurred under Clay because he was an outspoken anti-annexationist and he did not believe the British would threaten American territorial integrity by meddling in Texas (Kornblith 83). Without having to focus on a war or the fate of newly acquired territory, Clay could concentrate on economic policies, which Kornblith believes would undoubtedly “strengthen the second party system and push the slavery question into the background of national politics” (Kornblith 89). Ultimately he argues that the divisive issue of slavery, which would later evolve into the deeper questions of constitutionalism and sectionalism, would have never reached the breaking point that it did, if it were not for the annexation of the Mexican Cession.
Although much of Kornblith’s hypothetical history follows a logical procession, to jump from the plausible election of Henry Clay to an implausible peace between the north and the south requires an injudicious leap of faith. For instance, there is no doubt that Clay stood a reasonable chance at winning the election, and had he won, it is likely that he would have held steadfast to his position to oppose “immediate annexation of Texas” (Kornblith 83). However, to argue that focus would have shifted away from the sectional dispute of slavery over to a partisan dispute about tariffs and the national bank is too far reaching. The claim that disputes about the Missouri Compromise “would not have been raised during Clay’s presidency” (Kornblith 90) is possibly true; however, the claim that the problems surrounding the Missouri Compromise would not have precipitated heightened sectional tensions during the mid 19th century is largely unfounded. As is evident in the writings of many politicians and laypersons, the issue of slavery and abolition were highly focused in the popular collective. If there was not enough concern about the growing institution of slavery to incite sectional tensions, as Kornblith suggests, than what was the original cause for the Wilmot Proviso and all of its popular support? He argues that the increasing concern over the “Slave Power Conspiracy” caused the north to react with Wilmot Proviso which aroused intensely “conflicting passions” (Kornblith 89). However, for northerners to support such a divisive proposal, there must have already been heated tensions about the growing institution of slavery, even before the annexation of the Mexican Cession. Additionally, Kornblith does not convincingly explain how the preexisting tension about slavery would have taken a “backseat” to partisan politics, nor does he address the possibility of manifest destiny sentiments traversing beyond the “Clay presidency.”
Lol, I recognized the Butterfly Effect as well. It will suffice to say that most of the class will think that Kornblith has gone too far, however, I don’t think he ever tried to make an ironclad argument. Instead, he just wants to probe cracks in the Fundamentalist argument. I think he does it here with great efficacy. Without the Republicans, slavery could definitely have been omitted from national political planks. Instead, the economy and the immigration waves would have dominated political attention. Great Post!
Nice post indeed, Alex!
Incidentally, a historian friend just alerted me that Henry Clay and the election of 1844 made an unlikely appearance in the news today–namely, in Rand Paul’s maiden Senate speech today. If you watch the video, you’ll essentially hear him making Kornblith’s argument about how close Clay came to defeating Polk, though admittedly he adds some twists! Maybe his speechwriter was a history major?