Question 1:
In his book, Confederate Emancipation, Bruce Levine attempts to identify the major points of support and contention regarding the Confederate attempt to enlist slave soldiers. Documenting the history of the debate from the beginning of the war, to the slave enlistment legislation of 1865, and through the resulting subjugation of free blacks in the post-bellum South, Levine gives an explanation for both the causal mechanism of “Confederate Emancipation” and its meaning for Confederate leadership and Southern society. As he demonstrates, as early as 1863, Confederate officials, like Major-General Patrick Cleburne, were proposing the bold argument that the enlistment of slave soldiers was not only prudent, but necessary to overcome the larger and increasingly advancing Union army (Levine 2). Despite these efforts, Jefferson Davis and other high-ranking Confederate officials dismissed this idea as unnecessarily traumatic to the Southern economy and society (Levine 2). However, by 1865, the need for more troops, the decreasing morale of enlisted soldiers, the growing antagonism toward the planter class, and the mounting successes of the Union forces, caused important Confederate officials, like General Robert E. Lee, to declare the enlistment of slave soldiers as “not only expedient, but necessary” (Levine 5). In his work, Levine explains the how the steadfast views of white supremacy, the shifting political atmosphere of Richmond, and the ever plummeting trajectory of Confederate victory (Levine 29) aligned to cause “Confederate Emancipation” when, why, and how it did.
As slave enlistment became an apparent necessity for most informed Southerners, Confederate officials had to decide if they were willing to “sacrifice the central war aim for the sake of military success” by enlisting and freeing slaves (Levine 9). Levine argues that that Jefferson Davis and other Confederate officials realized that slavery and black enlistment were mutually exclusive. In order to get slaves to fight loyally for the Confederacy, the South “would have to offer them freedom in return,” this, Levine argues, was recognized as an “ineluctable fact” by Confederate officials (Levine 154). However, slavery still remained a critical economic and social part of the South. Levine points out that most Southerners believed that freeing the slaves would “defy god and topple society” (Levine 50). Additionally, he explains that freeing the slaves, the South’s “crucial agricultural workforce,” would endanger the populace, as well as the army, by limiting the available supply of food. It is apparent that the complex issue of enlisting slave soldiers presents critical logistical, social, and moral problems for the South. It is for this very reason that early calls for slave enlistment fell upon deaf ears (Levine 2). However, after the devastating battle of Chattanooga as well as the destructive march of Sherman along Georgia’s coast, the rational for slave enlistment became more apparent (Levine 21), and cries for slave black involvement no longer came from only outside traditional government organs.
Although “Confederate Emancipation” was the only route left for Southern victory, the ultimate decision to enlist the slaves, and therefore free them, was not pre-destined by the events of the war. By the time of black enlistment was seriously considered, there was less of a question of whether black soldiers were necessary and more of a question of whether it is worth sacrificing the most defining Confederate value for independence. According to the accounts of soldiers, many Southerners would have rather seen Confederate defeat than to have to fight alongside a slave (Levine 44). One soldier stated that his entire unit was unanimous in agreeing that “they would rather desert than serve with [a black soldier]” (Levine 44). Because black enlistment provided both an ideological problem for most Southerners and a practical problem for military victory, it is not surprising that Confederate officials waited until there was no other possible avenue for military victory other than slave soldiers. However, besides addressing the question of why “Confederate Emancipation” occurred when it did, Levine also addresses why black enlistment was even considered at all. His main argument is that Confederate officials, most notably Davis, saw achieving independence as the “sin qua non of continued social and economic supremacy” (Levine 153). When Davis realized that traditional chattel slavery and independence were not both possible, he made the decision to create black enlistment because it gave the Confederacy the best possible chance of achieving independence. However, the considerable delay and ultimate ineffectiveness of the 1865 program can be attributed to the intensely unpopular view of black enlistment (Levine 48) and the restrictiveness of Article 9, Section 4 of the Confederate constitution on government action regarding slavery (Levine 46).
Levine’s argument about the causes of black enlistment and its timing are valid given the social and practical problems he outlines regarding black enlistment and the necessity of black soldiers for independence. However, one important question that Levine leaves ambiguous is why there was such a large gap between popular opposition to enlisting slaves and the Confederate official’s steadfast commitment to independence (which at the end of the war were two competing ideologies). What Levine does point out is that toward the end of the war, deeply socialized beliefs about white supremacy still blinded many Southerners from seeing the long term Confederate goal of independence (Levine 56). All the while, Confederate officials began downplaying the necessity of slavery (Levine 154) and placed a greater importance in achieving self-determination. To account for this gap, I believe one has to address the personal motivations of each Confederate official involved. It is clear from accounts of average Southerners that slavery was perceived to be more influential for their way of life than self-determination. In contrast, for Confederate officials, independence would have a drastic effect on the trajectory of each of their lives. For example, being the new leaders of an independent state would have greatly increased Confederate officials access to economic resources and power. Furthermore, Confederate officials would not have to face the negative consequence of being convicted rebel leaders, such as imprisonment and public resentment, if they had actually achieved independence. Therefore, it is also important to look at the personal reasons Confederate officials had over the general population for supporting “Confederate Emancipation.”